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Abstract 
The aim of this article is to analyse the process of socialisation taking place at the 
level of the Council Working Groups (CWGs) dealing with the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP). Based on recent empirical evidence, this article explains the 
main codes of conduct adopted by the national diplomats in the CFSP CWGs, such 
as the reflex coordination or consensus-building practice. Compliance with these 
rules stems from strategic calculations based on legitimacy concerns and the long-
term perspective of the negotiations. Hence, in this case, the internalisation of 
norms has not taken place yet. Even though this view may suggest a 
conceptualisation of national representatives in the CWGs as passive “national 
champions”, it is argued here that they might also play a role in influencing the 
position of their capitals, mainly through the process of formulating the 
instructions. 
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1. Introduction   
Socialisation processes among national diplomats in Brussels were already identified in the early 
CFSP literature (de Schoutheete, 1980; Nuttall, 1992); nonetheless, an in-depth analysis about how 
socialisation takes place or what has been its impact on the policy-process or the policy-substance is 
still missing. This article aims, first, at establishing whether the socialisation argument is still valid 
nowadays, and second, at providing some empirical evidence regarding under which conditions this 
process occurs. Contrary to previous analyses, attention is paid to the lower levels of the decision-
making system, i.e. the CWGs. It is argued here that they should not be underestimated since they 
play a significant role in the EU’s Foreign Policy making.  
This article also intends to join the discussion on the nature of the socialisation process taking place 
within the EU institutions. Socialisation has often been conceived as a process of internalisation of 
the rules and norms of a group, implying a switch from a logic of consequences to a logic of 
appropriateness. This article explores whether or not this has also been the case in the CWGs, where 
interactions occur among national representatives embedded in two environments: national and 
European one. In this case, the analysis is primarily concerned with the adaptation to the formal and 
informal rules of behaviour within the CWGs.  
The article is based on more than 70 in-depth interviews conducted by both authors in Brussels with 
national representatives to the CWGs and EU officials (Commission and Council Secretariat 
General) in 2005 and early 2006. Some data comes also from an on-line survey conducted by the 
authors and filled in by 30 national representatives from 12 different CWGs. Overall, the research 
targeted diplomats from 20 Member States. The empirical evidence is complemented by participant 
observation in the CWGs meetings in 2005 and secondary literature.  
The article begins with a discussion concerning the concept of socialisation, referring to the ongoing 
debate in the academic literature. It is then argued that in the case of the CFSP CWGs, strategic 
action appears as the main mechanism behind socialisation. The article then moves on to explain the 
institutional setting of the CFSP CWGs and continues with an analysis of the codes of conduct. 
Finally, the question of actors’ legitimacy and credibility is raised. These factors are high at stake 
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the negotiations. Finally, the article tackles the issue of misunderstandings/tensions between the 
officials in the capitals and in Brussels, which points to the role of the national representatives as 
change agents in national foreign policies.  
2. Socialisation as a strategic action   
The approach presented in this article adopts as a starting point the rational actor: even in highly 
institutionalised frameworks, rationality plays a crucial role in determining actors’ behaviour. Actors 
are reflexive and take into account the social and normative context in which they find themselves 
when acting strategically. As it will be shown later in this article, national diplomats seconded to 
Brussels are not just shaped by the structure –i.e. they are not “structural idiots” (Beyers, 2005: 
933)–, but they are also reactive and ‘self-reflective’. This means that they are able to interpret their 
own behaviour (Glarbo, 1999: 648). This article advocates a model which situates self-reflective 
actors within an institutional context. This standpoint underpins our understanding of socialisation 
processes in the CWGs.  
In sociological analyses, socialisation has been conceptualised as a ‘process by which social 
interaction leads novices to endorse expected ways of thinking, feeling and acting’ (Johnston, 2001: 
493).(1) This results in the establishment of a ‘we-feeling’ among the policy-makers and may lead to 
emergence of a common ‘role identity’ (Deutsch, 1957: 5-7). For the purpose of this study, 
socialisation is defined as adaptation of certain rules of behaviour, ‘ways of doing things’, stemming 
from interaction with members of the same group. This definition does not imply internationalisation 
of rules and norms at the very moment actors enter into the new environment or group.(2) Instead, 
they start a process of learning the group’s rules and simultaneously participate in the group’s 
dynamics and legitimisation of appropriate behaviours. Only later, this process may result in the 
internalisation of the code of conduct. Such internalisation means ‘taken for grantedness’, so that the 
values and rules, ‘are not only hard to change, but that the benefits of behaviour are calculated in 
abstract social terms rather than concrete consequential terms’ (Johnston, 2001: 495). In other 
words, there is a switch from a logic of consequences to a logic of appropriateness (Checkel, 2005).  
In a recent issue of International Organization (Fall 2005), the contributors distinguished two types 
of internalisation (Checkel, 2005). Type I Internalisation implies that actors follow the rules of the 
community or group in which they are embedded without reflecting on whether they are or not the 
right thing to do. Actors would be just playing the role that it is socially expected. Type II 
Internalisation will be a step further in the internalisation of rules and norms (ibid: 804). In this case 
actors adopt the rules of the group because they consider that these rules are the “right thing to do” 
which would imply a change in values and interests following a logic of appropriateness. The 
authors also identify three mechanisms for socialization: role playing, normative suasion and 
strategic calculation (ibid: 808). In the first one, actors adopt the norms because they are appropriate 
in this environment (leading to Type I internalisation). Actors are role-players and imitate the 
behaviour of other members in the group. When asked why they follow the procedural norms they 
would answer: “I don’t know, because that’s what the others do” (ibid: 811-812). As it will be 
argued throughout this article, this is not the case in the CWGs because national diplomats are self-
reflective and when asked about why they adopt these norms they respond in terms of national 
interest. Nonetheless, exceptionally, when they arrive to the CWGs, national diplomats might mimic 
the behaviour of their colleagues simply because they lack the templates. As Johnston (2005: 1021) 
argues such behaviour, “unlike strategic emulation, does not mean searching for and copying 
exemplars (…) It is rather a satisficing first step designed simply to be able to participate in the 
group by following its most basic rules”.  
In the case of the second mechanism, normative suasion sees actors as self-reflecting and engaging 
in communicative action to persuade others. This mechanism leads to Type II internalisation. When 
asked about why they follow the procedural norms they would answer: “because they are the right 
Page 3 of 17 EIoP: Text 2006-011: Full Textthing to do” (ibid: 812). If this type of internalisation occurred in the CWGs, we would observe that 
national diplomats follow the CWGs practices even when this would be in contradiction with their 
national positions and could lead to changes in national preferences.  
Finally, in the case of strategic calculation, actors adopt the behavioural rules following social or 
material incentives. Strategic calculation does not involve internalisation of norms and hence actors 
follow the logic of consequences. Actors are strategic and self-reflective. When asked about why do 
they follow the procedural norms they would answer: “because I have to maintain my legitimacy and 
reputation within the group in order to better achieve my instructions” (ibid: 809).  
In the CFSP CWGs, where arguably evidence of internationalisation of norms is still lacking, 
compliance with cognitive scripts can be better explained by strategic factors: long-term perspective 
of the negotiations and reputation. Before internalisation occurs, socialisation may be better 
perceived as a strategic action undertaken by actors, pursuing their interests and resulting from a 
rational cost-benefit calculations (that is, the strategic calculation mechanism in Checkel, 2005). This 
will be referred to in the article as strategic socialisation. Sociological accounts of socialisation have 
underestimated the strategic use of norms and practices (Checkel, 2005; Schimmelfennig, 2000: 
135). The actors’ motivation to follow social pressures stems from the desire to maintain or improve 
their position within the group, as part of their long-term interest calculation. Legitimacy and 
reputation, factors contributing to one actor’s status in a group, become highly appreciated as they 
improve the chances of getting the national interest reflected in the policy outcome. Credibility is 
particularly important in the case of iterated negotiations, such as those taking place in the EU, 
where frequent and repetitive contacts with the same group of officials occur. Such conceptualisation 
of socialisation does not exclude that in the long-term, especially when actors remain in the same 
group for long time periods, the behavioural rules become naturally done things (internalised). 
Nonetheless, the empirical evidence gathered in this research does not support the last point in the 
case of the CWGs.  
Some scope conditions facilitating internalisation are identified by Lewis (2005: 945-947) to guide 
the empirical research, among them: insulation, the density of issues and low level of rotation. This 
article provides empirical evidence that the above do not occur in the case of the CWGs, what may 
explain the lack of internationalisation I or II. Contrary to what happens in COREPER (ibid: 945), 
meetings in the CWGs are not insulated. Some national representatives to the CWGs mentioned 
incidents where their colleagues had been reprimanded by their COREPER II, PSC ambassadors or 
the capitals. Even other external actors can have access to CWGs negotiations.(3) This condition is 
linked with another one stated by Johnston: the degree of agent autonomy (2005: 1018). In those 
cases where there is an ample leeway, internationalisation is more likely to occur. National 
representatives in the CWGs have however relatively less margin of manoeuvre than their colleagues 
in COREPER.  
The density of issues implies a high complexity and horizontal of the meeting agendas dealing with 
various policies such as in COREPER. In contrast, the experts in the CWGs deal with a narrower 
range of issues within a geographical or functional area. Moreover, the level of rotation of the 
national representatives to the CWGs is higher than in other Council bodies such as COREPER or 
PSC (ibid: 946). Regarding the last scope condition, the rotation levels, national diplomats 
participate in the same CWG for an average of 2-3 years, after which they might leave for another 
CWG or return to their capitals. This high rotation prevents internalisation of behavioural rules. 
However, when national diplomats remain for longer periods in the CWGs, they might internalise 
the norms as a “reflex” or “taken-for-granted habit, without any conscious act of 
persuasion” (Checkel, 2005: 811). Before proceeding with an analysis of socialisation, we briefly 
explain the institutional setting of the CWGs.  
3. The CFSP Council Working Groups   
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among Member States. This view is usually based on analyses of CFSP at the high political levels 
such as negotiations at the European Council or the General Affairs and External Relations Council 
(GAERC) (e.g. Moravcsik, 1993). Later analyses have focused on the level of ambassadors, either 
COREPER or PSC (Lewis, 2005; Duke, 2005). However, these studies underestimate the role played 
by the CWGs in the EU’s foreign policy-making. A large part of the Council workload is already 
agreed at the level of the CWGs and it reaches the PSC and/or COREPER II as A points in the 
agenda.(4) Thus, approximately 70 per cent of the total of the items in the GAERC agenda has been 
previously agreed in the CWGs and 15-20 per cent in COREPER (Duke and Vanhoonacker, 2006: 
169). When considering these percentages, it has to be noted that decisions on more political or 
contentious issues are reserved to higher levels, such as granting candidate status or nomination of 
the EU Special Representatives.(5)  
With the Treaty of Maastricht, the former EPC Working Parties(6) were merged with their 
communitarian counterparts, although some CFSP-specific CWGs remained. The role of the CFSP 
CWGs is to discuss and draft CFSP documents such as Joint Actions, Council Conclusions, Action 
Plans. The CWGs are composed of national representatives based in the Permanent Representations 
in Brussels. Having said that, it has to be noted that the CWGs also meet in “capital formations” 
composed by officials from the MFAs. In average, they meet twice per Presidency, however it 
depends on the CWG. For example, COWEB (Western Balkans) meets three or four times per 
Presidency, whereas COTRA (Transatlantic Relations) meets very rarely, not even once per 
Presidency.(7) These “capitals” meetings serve to review the overall policy and raise specific issues, 
but no formal negotiations take place during the meetings. This article focuses on the first type of 
CWGs, composed by Brussels-based representatives.  
There are thirty-six permanent CFSP CWGs that have been set following thematic (Transatlantic 
Relations, Non-Proliferation, United Nations, Human Rights) or geographical lines (Western 
Balkans, EFTA, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Latin America). With the development of ESDP, 
new CWGs have been created such as the EU Military Committee WG. Moreover, two committees 
have been established, dealing with the military (EU Military Committee or EUMC) and the civilian 
aspects of the EU’s crisis management policies (Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis 
Management or CIVCOM). Apart from this, one can add two specialist CWGs: the Nicolaidis Group 
and the Antici Group, in charge of preparing the agenda of the PSC and COREPER II, respectively. 
Finally, the RELEX Counsellors WG is in charge of ensuring horizontal co-ordination between 
CFSP and communitarian matters.  
Most of the CFSP CWGs meetings are held on a frequent basis, e.g. once or twice a week. 
Sometimes, the CWGs hold joint meetings to discuss cross-cutting issues, such as visa facilitation. 
At the level of the CWGs, there are also meetings of the Troika with third parties, such as the US, 
Canada or Russia. Not all of the CWGs share the same position in European foreign policy-making. 
As asserted by few practitioners, there is a feeling that the groups responsible for the most sensitive 
issues such as COTRA have a lesser say in shaping the policy than those responsible for other 
policies like COEST (Eastern and Central Asia) or COWEB. The ESDP committees (EUMC and 
CIVCOM) occupy an intermediate position between bodies at higher levels (COREPER II and PSC) 
and the CWGs. The EUMC, for example, is composed by senior officials from the MoD and 
disposes of its own preparatory body (the EUMC WG).  
4. Looking back: socialisation in the CFSP literature   
Socialisation of elites is present in the vast literature on the development of the EPC and later the 
CFSP. Different authors argued that as a consequence of repeated contacts and information exchange 
between the foreign policy makers, a process of socialisation emerged (Manners and Whitman, 
2000; Nuttall, 1992, 2000; Smith, M.E., 2004; Tonra, 2001). Initially, a process known as the co-
ordination reflex developed between the national diplomats. This was noted in the Copenhagen 
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reflex of coordination (…) which has profoundly affected the relations of the Member States between 
each other and with third countries” (as quoted in Allen and Wallace, 1982: 26). The EPC brought 
together diplomacies “in time and space on regular basis” and as a result “provided completely 
different terms for social integration between both national diplomacies and their individual 
diplomats” (Glarbo, 1999: 640). As Nutall (1992: 312) observed: “The (…) great success claimed 
for Political Cooperation is the phenomenon of socialisation. This is an automatic reflex of 
consultation brought by frequent personal contacts with opposite members from other Member 
States”.  
As a result from their participation in EPC/CFSP, national representatives were “exposed to a spirit 
of cooperation and mutual understanding” (Beyers, 2002), what some called esprit de corps. For his 
part, Tonra (2001: 261) asserts that even though there is no evident European policy identity, there is 
already a “basic commitment and belief in joint policy-making”. A national representative, referring 
to the esprit de corps, claimed: “It does exist. People just know each other privately, invite each 
other for the meetings, also on private grounds, discuss various issues and some kind of community 
emerges… lets call it community of thinking or community of common views”.(8)  
Arguably, the club-like atmosphere described in the EPC and CFSP literature, still exists nowadays, 
after the last EU enlargement. Despite often expressed doubts, whether this esprit de corps would 
continue when more actors take a seat around the table, a majority of the interviewees claimed that 
the informal cooperation has actually increased after the enlargement. One of them stated: “As there 
are now 25 states in the room, more is done outside, drafting is often done informally”(9) and in a 
similar tone, another one asserted: “The enlargement process has strengthened the tendency to make 
all major decisions outside the formal meetings”.(10) New Member States have quickly learnt the 
importance of informal contacts between the experts at CWG level(11). As stated by an official of 
the Polish MFA: “We are learning some procedures. I am not talking about the formal aspects, 
because these are relatively easy to grasp. I am rather thinking of the skills to build informal 
coalitions, agreeing on positions in the corridors, in the early stage, in order to avoid clashes later 
on.”(12)  
One of the results of this diplomatic intersubjectivity has been the emergence of a common code of 
conducting foreign policy. Our recent empirical study on several external relations CWGs point to 
the existence and importance of such informal codes of practices that will be explained in the next 
section.  
5. Code of conduct in the CWGs   
A process of information sharing, so-called coordination reflex, provides the basis for the national 
officials’ work. As one of the diplomats has recently put it: “If you don’t exchange information, you 
are nobody”.(13) Even though, this consultation has been labelled as a “reflex” in the CFSP 
literature, we argue in this article that actors do still take into account who do they share information 
with and for which purposes (i.e. they are self-reflective). This sharing-information is perceptible in 
the increase of communicative practices among the CFSP officials.(14) Informal consultations prior 
to the meeting are part of every-day work of the representatives as a means to facilitate consensus. In 
contrast, in these very rare cases where informal contacts are not so intense, cooperation and 
therefore, consensus is more difficult to be achieved. For instance, one national representative stated: 
“Because we meet in COTRA so rarely, we look at each other, but we keep our 
construction of Member States separated from the others. This psychological or 
symbolical element is probably very important in our work, in our games for the EU 
foreign policy making. But in the case of COTRA, we remain separated, we do look at 
each other, but suspiciously, (…) you don’t even find the mood for co-operation.”(15)
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(CORTESY) or the mailing lists of the CWGs. Nonetheless, a large bulk of information-sharing is 
informal (for channels of socialisation see Box 1). The representatives remain in close contact 
through e-mails, mobile phones and frequent meetings that often occur in the corridors and over 
lunch. As one representative expressed it: “I am trying to meet my colleagues on a frequent basis: 
during the group formal meetings, but also before and afterwards, during lunches and any other 
gatherings.”(16)  
Consultations might take place bilaterally, in a group formation or in the format of confessionals 
with the Presidency. During these informal negotiations, national representatives inform other 
colleagues about their positions, in particular “red lines”, or exchange other type of information that 
may help the decision-making process. They also undertake informal negotiations in order to achieve 
a compromise before the meeting. As a result, “many issues appear ‘pre-cooked’ in the agenda, 
especially the sensitive ones”.(17) In some CWGs, so-called ‘like-minded’ groups, based on similar 
interests on certain issues, have been established in order to prepare beforehand their common line of 
action.(18) During these informal meetings, attendants often arrange in detail the strategy for the 
next CWG formal meeting: when each of them would intervene, what they would say and how they 
would reply to other delegations. As a consequence, the formal meeting is reduced to a mere 
representation of these “roles”. The like-minded groups operate on a very informal basis and usually 
participants credit each other with trust. As an example of this may serve an incident, when a higher-
ranked diplomat was denied access to the group on the grounds that it would “infringe the group’s 
intimacy.”(19)  
This coordination reflex also implies a tendency to take others’ views into account when formulating 
national positions (instructions). According to Ben Tonra (2001), many foreign policy-makers and 
CFSP officials acknowledged the fact that it became a natural reflex, i.e. they were taking into 
consideration what would be acceptable for their European partners, rather than simply what the 
national position, based on national interest would be. The reflex coordination would appear 
therefore as a habit, a naturally done thing, in contrast with rational calculations to pursue self-
interested preferences. In other words, this would be an example of role playing by non-reflective 
actors (Checkel, 2005). However, the interviews conducted by the authors supported the argument 
that national representatives are self-reflective when adopting the rules of the CFSP CWGs. In the 
case of the co-ordination reflex, it is seen by the diplomats as a way to increase their chances in the 
negotiations and avoid isolation in the CWG. For example, according to a practitioner, “obviously 
one cannot ignore the positions of twenty four other countries and also the Commission when 
formulating a statement – this is a starting point to avoid being left in isolation”.(20)  
As a result of the increase of these communicative practices among national representatives, 
European states no longer feel threatened by sharing information with their European colleagues. On 
the contrary, they have multiplied their mutual exchanges. Some of them admit they even share 
selected sensitive information with their counterparts, in particular if it helps to reach a compromise. 
Such information includes for example circulating national instructions, security assessments or 
Box 1: Channels of socialisation 
z Regular Working Groups meetings in the Council once or twice a week.  
z Extraordinary meetings of the Working Groups and additional formal social events.  
z Informal meetings, with the Presidency, bilateral meetings or in a group (so called 'like-
minded groups').  
z Meetings on private occasions. The atmosphere in the group is often very 'friendly': group 
photos are taken at the end of presidencies, former group members stay in touch, visit each 
other, inform about personal issues even on the special group-mailing lists  
z Networks of formal and informal communication; these vary from COREU messages, 
frequent contacts via phone to mailing lists.  
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Another code of conduct that has been identified in the CFSP literature is the consensus building 
practice. CFSP is subject to intergovernmental bargaining with states retaining their veto powers 
(with few exceptions). A national representative compared this with pillar I in the following way: “I 
was before in the MFA, dealing with pillar I issues, where negotiations are much tougher and you 
are more prepared to loose something. But in CFSP you can always say no. And if you are really 
serious about your no, nobody can stop you from blocking it. But this is rarely seen”.(22) 
Interestingly enough, Member States do not usually make use of their veto power during 
negotiations; on the contrary, there is a general practice to ‘keep everyone on-board’ and to achieve 
consensus. According to one official, “the most important thing is the readiness of everybody to 
contribute to a solution” and another mentioned “there is a very strong impulse to reach a 
compromise”.(23) The Member States’ diplomats try to generate a broad agreement regarding the 
decision, so no Member State is excluded (decisions by QMV) or auto-excluded (resorting to 
constructive abstention). This is a two-way process because not only will the majority try to integrate 
the minority, but also the potentially isolated state will try to find supporters, instead of behaving 
unilaterally. In other words, “you have to avoid isolation, especially if you are a small or medium 
size Member State”.(24)  
One of the main driving forces in the day-to-day CWGs practice is the search for agreement within 
the group. As stated by a diplomat “there is always a pressure to get an agreement, if you don’t get a 
result, you have nothing. (...) we have to achieve meaningful results, a result in substance”.(25) The 
national representatives often have a common interest in producing results at the end of the day, i.e. 
to be effective. Thus, it is not rare that at the final stages of a long meeting the pressure stemming 
from the group and the Presidency is high for reaching agreement and not leaving any unsolved 
problem to be passed on to a higher political level.(26) Understood in these terms, effectiveness of 
the CWGs is usually high since according to practitioners and academics 90% to 95% of the issues 
in the agenda are agreed. The question here is why they follow this consensus-building norm. 
According to our findings, even when they give up on some issues, such consensus-oriented 
behaviour stems from their long-term calculus.  
Final agreement can adopt different forms: a consensus formula accepted by all the Member States; a 
compromise formula or false compromise (different readings for different Member States of the 
same document); or even a formula listing all the different options.(27) However, it has to be noted 
that in a few CWGs this effect-oriented approach is lacking. This is the case in COTRA because of 
the highly politicised nature of the transatlantic relations. As mentioned before, the role of this CWG 
in EU’s foreign policy is very limited and similarly, the interactions among their members,(28) 
which arguably would have limited the degree of socialisation among them.  
Another principle is the existence of domaines réservés. These are issues that cannot be submitted 
to discussion and interference from the other Member States. Traditionally, these areas covered 
security issues (national defence, borders, nuclear status or neutrality) and special relationships. 
Sensitive issues are often kept out of the discussions in the CWGs and go straight to the higher level. 
That was the case with the negotiations on the common space on security with Russia which was 
only discussed at the PSC.(29) On the other hand, a member of a group dealing with transatlantic 
relations pointed out that any politically ‘hot’ matters in EU-US relations, such as Iraq, were always 
kept out of the discussions.(30) Other examples of issues that will not be discussed in the CWG 
given by the national diplomats included: broader co-operation between EU-NATO (in the EUMC 
WG); agreement on money laundering with Switzerland (in the EFTA WG); Ukrainian EU 
membership (in COEST), institutional matters; borders and bilateral issues of the EU Member 
States.(31)  
There are also more detailed rules of behaviour and often their breaching is perceived by others as 
‘inappropriate’, leading to a decrease in one’s credibility in the group (see next section). These are 
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the language used. They include, for example:  
z Vertical and horizontal consistency: no contradicting in the CWG the position taken before on 
a higher level, not opening the issues previously closed in the CWGs on a higher political 
forum and definitely not contradicting the positions on different forums. As one of the 
representatives put it: "You have to say the same things in different fora (…) Horizontally, but 
also vertically. You have to be able to say the same thing at the technical and at the political 
level. What you say has to be the same that what your Minister says at the Council or your 
Prime Minister at the European Council. It is not easy, and you have sometimes countries that 
do not say the same thing at different levels. This is badly perceived. It means that you are not 
serious, that your system does not work". (32)  
z When instructions are considered by the representative to be 'difficult to justify' within the 
group, they would usually resort to the phrase "according to my instructions…" or "according 
to my capital…"(33). This is an informal sign to other group members, contrary to beginning 
your contribution with "We think…".  
z Maintaining "positive" relations with other representatives and trying to avoid direct clashes of 
positions in the CWG are other informal practices. An official mentioned that "it's very 
important to have emotional intelligence and of course, not to disturb the others. If you disturb 
the atmosphere in the group (…) you will not find a constructive attitude".(34) This positive 
working atmosphere is crucial to facilitate consensus-building.  
z Members of the CWGs have to respect the policy that had been agreed previously in the 
Council Conclusions. For instance, according to one practitioner: "you don't argue with the so-
called agreed-language, the EU's agreed policy established before. You cannot say now 'I 
don't agree with the Thessaloniki agenda" (35).  
z Other rules can help to protect your legitimacy and reputation, for example, "there is a rule of 
not expressing the radical position, if there are other radicals in the group", (36) i.e. hiding 
behind their back.  
z Similarly, it is in good practice to seriously consider Commission's proposals as well as the 
deals proposed by the Presidency.  
6. Who cares about legitimacy and credibility in the CWGs?  
National representatives learn the 'code of conduct' and apply it in their everyday work. As 
mentioned above, it is often a strategic action, aimed at strengthening one's position in the group and 
raising the chances of success in the future. From this perspective, adoption of the group's rules is a 
tactical move, a sort of negotiation strategy, employed in order to achieve their goals and not because 
it is "the right thing to do". It is due to the fact that legitimacy and credibility within the group are 
high at stake among the national representatives in the Council. As claimed by one of them, 
"credibility is something you gain if you are constructive in the discussions" (37). Another one added 
in a similar tone: "Here, we have to join the play that is performed. Either we will have a role in it, 
or we will just be extras. If we want to play a role, we have to join the consensus as often as possible. 
This is how we build our position". (38) 
One diplomat referred to two types of credibility in the Council: both personal and country’s 
credibility. Independently from the state’s credibility, once the position of the diplomat within the 
group is strong, it is generally perceived easier to negotiate and make one’s voice heard. In this 
situation increasing personal credibility is good for the country’s general effectiveness. Nonetheless, 
in some situations a representative is entrapped in a difficult position, where the two credibilities are 
in conflict. As one of them described such situation in which he is obliged to present instruction that 
has no chance of succeeding:  
“It is difficult to present instructions, knowing people around the table and knowing 
what they think about it. (…) Why should I make a fool of myself? What people do then, 
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them out… In this way, they protect themselves but not their countries.”(39)  
This example also shows that on some occasions, individual diplomats might internalise the 
behavioural procedures and only reluctantly break the code of conduct, for the sake of their national 
position. This is due to the fact that they are embedded in two environments, the Brussels one and 
the capital one. The capital factor is a very important one since national representatives are watched 
from their MFAs and they have to report back. In sum, they have to be effective in their role in 
Brussels.  
Eventually, for the practitioners, it all comes down to ‘having your amendments approved’, which is 
a sign that your strategy works.(40) The credibility determines the effectiveness of the 
representative, and can be a chance for smaller Member States to have a stronger impact on policy-
making. As one diplomat claimed: “You have representatives from small Member States that can 
make a huge impact on and you have representatives from big Member States (…) that in spite of the 
size of their country do not influence the negotiations”.(41) An example was given of a diplomat 
from Portugal in COWEB who influenced the negotiations helping to build the consensus. Another 
example is one of a Danish representative in PMG, who was an active player, even though his 
country has an opt-out in defence issues.  
A representative may however loose his/her credibility within the group by breaking the code of 
behaviour. This can happen as a result of trying to force a position that is very radical or simply 
‘unforceable’, which is badly perceived by other group members. Hence, ‘later on, whatever you 
say, even if these are the best ideas, they are ignored in silence… That is why I have to build my 
position. Everyone has to know I am pragmatic and ready to negotiate’.(42) The representatives take 
into account the long-term results of the negotiations and are sometimes ready to make minimal 
concessions in their national short-term preferences. Nonetheless, this is done only if it improves 
their overall standing within the group and increases the chances of success regarding more 
important issues. This was described by one representative as the ability to ‘sacrifice an ill-perceived 
or short-term national interest in order to invest in long-term capacity that can be used in more 
important issues’.(43)  
7. Different perceptions between Brussels and the capitals: who 
writes instructions for whom?   
A crucial question to be asked regards the position that the representatives want to achieve. Is it the 
original national position or has it been modified by their interactions in Brussels? As one of the 
diplomats admitted: “This is the first lesson that you learn when you come to Brussels: the toughest 
negotiations take place between the capital and Brussels”.(44) The representatives emphasize the 
difference between the perceptions of officials in Brussels and those in the capital, which 
occasionally leads to discussion over the instructions or convincing the capital that the instructions 
should be changed for the sake of the state’s credibility in the group.(45) In such cases they argue 
that the national position is not ‘quite in tune with the negotiating atmosphere here in Brussels’.(46) 
As one of them observed, this does not mean loosing one’s effectiveness: “I am perceived in a better 
light and hence my next ideas are taken into account, whereas if I am perceived as a troublemaker, 
who spoils the atmosphere and asks for impossible, they are omitted”.(47) This was also a lesson 
learnt by the representatives of the new Member States, who, as observed by their counterparts 
“make things softer, they gained some confidence and friendship with other colleagues and so they 
feel confident to present things less radical that their capitals might wish, but at the end they get 
more results.”(48) In this way, national diplomats are able to use their expertise and institutional 
position to influence not only European politics and decision making, but also their foreign 
ministries (Spence, 2002: 33). They see themselves as the “transmission belts” of every day business 
in Brussels to their capitals.(49)  
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two social environments: domestic and European (Beyers, 2002; 2005). The code of conduct 
associated with the latter is learnt after their arrival in Brussels and the first one (national) is 
subsequently modified. The diplomats sometimes act as ‘change agents’ in relation to their own 
national administration. The process starts during their stay abroad, but the influence can be exerted 
even stronger after their return to the capitals (the so called ‘contagion’ effect; see Page and 
Wouters, 1995: 197).(50) In this way, they take an active part in the process of Europeanisation of 
national foreign policies in both directions: national adaptation and promoting national policy goals 
on the European level. Those capital officials that spent even a few weeks training in Brussels 
claimed that it allowed them to see the work of their colleagues from different perspective and to 
understand better what was expected from the capital. Those that left the capitals and started working 
in Brussels felt the growing gap between themselves and their colleagues from the ministry. One of 
them observed that in Brussels “everything changes faster, when it comes to the mentality of the 
diplomats” and that the people in the capital “become frustrated, as they feel that we are getting 
further away and then the lack of understanding appears”.(51)  
There are different ways of influencing the actual substance of instructions. Some diplomats admit 
that on some occasions they are not given any precise instructions: “I am very happy when I don’t 
have instructions. Generally, when I receive instructions, I am much more constrained in achieving 
result.”(52) Depending on organizational structure and the strength of representative’s own position 
within it, they make sure their instructions are what they would like to receive. As one official 
clarified: “What I do is write instructions for myself. I write to [the capital] what I am going to do, 
what I am going to say and unless I get something different, I will proceed with this line.”(53) 
Several of the representatives from both, new and old Member States emphasized there was nothing 
worse than receiving “stupid” instructions with “crazy ideas”, which send them “to die” or “kill 
themselves” “with an instruction which is completely out of the point”.(54) Therefore, some of them 
admit they act early to prevent receiving such instructions. Nonetheless, there are also possibilities of 
negotiating the changes during the meetings of the CWGs. It is a common practice that the 
representatives either take phone calls quietly in the negotiation room or leave for a few minutes. 
The “flexibility” of instructions and the freedom given to the representatives varies among the 
Member States. For example, the Germans, Austrians and Swedish are usually mentioned as 
examples of diplomats with less room for manoeuvre.  
The diplomats emphasize that the capitals lack an overall feeling about the atmosphere in the CWG 
and experience regarding to what position has chances of getting accepted and what arguments to 
use in order to convince the others. Even though the officials from the capitals attend occasionally 
the meetings of the CWGs in the so-called capital formations, the atmosphere in such meetings is 
completely different. The representatives based in Brussels would usually also accompany the 
capital official, taking a seat behind. Reports from the CWGs meetings play an important role as to 
early warning about possible conflicts, signalling the positions of others as well as the most 
important themes for national interest. It is also worth mentioning that the representatives of the 
CWGs attend the points relevant to their work at the meetings of PSC or COREPER II, advising 
their ambassadors. Hence, their role is not finished when the dossier leaves the level of experts.  
8. Concluding remarks   
This contribution offered some insights into the nature of socialisation process at the level of experts 
in the CWGs. Socialisation has been widely perceived in the extant CFSP literature as internalisation 
of norms, missing possible rational motivations behind this process. This research however points to 
the fact that in the case of the CWGs socialisation has mainly followed a strategic calculus. It also 
served to emphasise the relevance of the lower-levels of the decision making system in the European 
foreign policy. In spite of the technical nature of the issues discussed in the CWGs, they still exert an 
impact on the direction of the EU foreign policy. A large bulk of the CFSP workload, such as 
drafting of Council Conclusions, is already agreed at this level and simply “rubber stamped” by 
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their capitals’ voices in Brussels, but also influence their masters in the Ministries. This is done 
through the process of formulating the instructions, which is based on a continuous dialogue with the 
capital.  
The article also identified the main practices constituting the code of conduct, supported with recent 
empirical evidence. The behavioural rules presented here include for example: reflex coordination, 
consensus building, domaines réservés, and maintaining consistency between different levels of 
decision-making. These rules are learnt as a result of diplomats’ participation in the CWGs. Non-
compliance may damage the legitimacy and credibility within the group, which may decrease the 
chances of influencing the final outcome.  
The empirical evidence supports the argument that in most of the cases internalisation of behavioural 
rules within the CFSP CWGs has not occurred. Instead, the code of conduct has been applied as a 
part of a strategic calculus, in which legitimacy and credibility (of their own and of their countries), 
as well as the long-term perspective of the negotiations, played a crucial role. An important factor 
explaining why the rules have not been fully internalised might be the fact that the diplomats are 
embedded in two logics. The first one comes from their capitals, whereas the second one is learnt 
upon their arrival to Brussels. This element is also shared with the representatives in other Council 
bodies such as COREPER (Lewis, 2005). However, in the case of CFSP CWGs, the national 
allegiance is stronger due to the high levels of rotation. The shadow of the capital is always present.  
Yet, it is worthy to note some methodological challenges when trying to apply theory into practice 
and conduct empirical research on socialisation. It is difficult to prove whether the norm has been 
internalised or merely followed strategic calculations. If we just rely on the discourse in order to 
trace the utilisation of norms, we immediately face the question: do actors believe in what they say? 
Are they just engaged in rhetorical action? As it seems an impossible task to ‘get into people’s 
heads’, many academics limited their research to a discourse analysis, pointing out the importance of 
the language used. We argue here that while such analysis is important, it should be complemented 
by other methods. These include process tracing, elite in-depth interviews(55) and questionnaires. 
The interviews should be ideally conducted prior the entry into a group and at a later stage, when 
actors have already spent some time in the new environment.  
On the other hand, variation in degrees of socialisation may be explained by different variables, such 
as the impact of previous socialisation experiences (at their MFAs/participation in other multilateral 
fora); the length of time he/she has been a member of the group, different national administrative 
cultures and trainings or even personal characteristics. Therefore, more comparative research is 
needed to examine socialisation affecting officials from different Member States and from different 
CWGs.  
The final question to be raised is whether the findings of the article bring us any closer to 
understanding the impact of different types of socialisation on 1) the policy process and 2) the 
outcome of the European foreign policy. As regards the first issue, socialisation has arguably 
changed the dynamics of the negotiation process. This is particularly visible in the adaptation 
process experienced by the newcomers after the last enlargement. The representatives from the new 
Member States have learnt to respect the code of conduct and hence a deadlock in the decision-
making process has been prevented. They became less radical in presenting their positions; they seek 
the approval of their colleagues even before the formal meetings and resort to “EU values” to present 
their positions. Moreover, further research could look at the links between governance and the 
context of negotiations. For instance, how the enlargement, by increasing informal practices, also 
brought changes in modes of governance leading for example to more deliberative type negotiations, 
instead of bargaining-oriented ones.  
The impact on the policy outcome is more subtle. Because of the consensus oriented behaviour the 
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policies are formulated under different conditions what may also have an impact on their actual 
policies. For example, some Member States (in particular, small Member States) have gained access 
to more information from their partners what can lead to shifts in preferences or even help to 
formulate positions in those cases where they did not have one before. In sum, the article could serve 
as a starting point for a new research agenda that should start questioning the conception of 
socialisation as it has been understood in previous research on CFSP.  
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Endnotes  
(*) Both authors would like to express their gratitude for the kind assistance they were given by 
national representatives, as well as the EU officials, during their fieldwork in Brussels. We also 
thank two anonymous referees for their constructive comments. 
(1) In the CFSP literature, it has been defined as a force shaping ‘the practices, perceptions and 
interests of policy makers’, including any possible redefinition of self-interest’ (Manners, Whitman, 
2000: 7-8). 
(2) Socialisation has to be also distinguished from the concept of Brusselisation (Allen, 1998: 54). 
The latter only refers to the physical transfer of the decision-making from the capitals to Brussels-
based bodies. As such, Brusselisation does not exclude socialisation and often facilitates it. In 
contrast, Nuttall (2000) argued that Brusselisation could eventually obstruct the “reflex 
coordination” and the “club-like atmosphere” by increasing the number of actors and 
bureaucratization of the CFSP.  
(3) According to one practitioner, “if you think you are talking just to the 25 Member States then you 
are mistaken. If you are mentioning a specific country there is 99% chance that it will reach them, 
even the same day”. Interview in Brussels. 
(4) The “A” points in the GAERC agenda are points that have been already agreed in lower levels 
and they are just “formally” approved by GAERC without discussion. The “B” points are the issues 
on which the Foreign Ministers will have to concentrate to get an agreement.  
Page 14 of 17 EIoP: Text 2006-011: Full Text(5) For example, although there were some discussions in COWEB (Western Balkans WG) about 
potential candidates for the post of the EU Special Representative in BiH, this decision could not be 
taken at the level of the CWG since it also involved negotiations with the Peace Implementation 
Council. Interviews in Brussels.  
(6) There is some confusion in the literature regarding the terminology. The term Working Parties, 
according to Nuttall (2000: 249), was used with reference to the EC preparatory bodies, whereas 
Working Groups was used in the context of the EPC. They were merged with the establishment of a 
single institutional framework (Treaty of Maastricht), officially known as Standing Working Parties. 
However, both terms are in common use among the practitioners and the academics. In this article 
the term Working Groups is preferred. 
(7) According to one interviewee, the last two “capitals” meetings have taken place in November 
2004 and in February 2006 respectively.  
(8) As another representative claimed: “There is a kind of family atmosphere in a group, I probably 
spend more time with my group colleagues than with the other representatives from my country”. 
Interviews in Brussels.  
(9) Ibid. 
(10) On-line survey on Council Working Groups.  
(11) Some diplomats from new Member States were surprised by the process of socialisation taking 
place at the CFSP level and would even considered it as “not the right” way of doing business in the 
international organisation (e.g. one of them was struck by the habit of addressing national 
representatives by the Presidency using their names rather than countries they represented). 
Interviews in Brussels.  
(12) Interview in Warsaw.  
(13) Interviews in Brussels. 
(14) According to the on-line survey conducted by the authors, 17.9 % of the representatives to the 
CWGs always consult with other national delegations prior to formal meetings, and 71.4 % consult 
most of the time.  
(15) Interviews in Brussels. 
(16) Ibid. 
(17) Ibid.  
(18) On some occasions, these like-minded groups are very structured, like in the case of COWEB. 
In other cases, these groups vary depending on the issue for discussion (for example, CIVCOM or 
COEST).  
(19) Interviews in Brussels. 
(20) Ibid. 
(21) On-line survey on Council Working Groups.
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(23) Ibid.  
(24) Ibid.  
(25) Ibid. 
(26) According to a CWG official, the CWGs should not send to higher levels texts with technical 
square brackets, which means that you do not have an agreement because of time pressure or lack of 
information. This would be a signal of lack of effectiveness. Interviews in Brussels. 
(27) Interviews in Brussels. 
(28) As stated by a national diplomat: “These informal exchanges are not so important in COTRA 
because of the lack of this effect-oriented approach”. Interviews in Brussels. 
(29) Ibid.  
(30) On-line survey on Council Working Groups. 
(31) Ibid.  
(32) Interviews in Brussels. 
(33) Several confidential interviews in Brussels confirmed that practice. 
(34) Ibid. 
(35) Ibid. 
(36) Ibid. 
(37) Ibid. 
(38) Ibid. Another one added in a similar tone: “I realized that since you start to be integrated within 
the group, since you start to be constructive, to be active, to make proposals, to be on the lead of 
things, instead of wait and see (…) then your credibility grows”. 
(39) Ibid. 
(40) Ibid. 
(41) Ibid. 
(42) Ibid. 
(43) Ibid. 
(44) Interview in Brussels. In their report from the ongoing research project Heinisch and Mesner 
(2005: 15) examining the culture of COREPER negotiations refer to the “dual loyalty” of Permanent 
Representatives (PermReps). They argue that it is stronger in COREPER than in other bodies, since 
the PermReps have to defend not only the national position, but also serve the European idea. In a 
Page 16 of 17 EIoP: Text 2006-011: Full Textsimilar line to what is argued in this article, they claim that apart from negotiation success, the 
“willingness to compromise and work on joint solutions is equally important for acting successfully 
in COREPER and for gaining the respect of their colleagues” (Heinisch and Mesner 2005: 16). 
(45) Some evidence of similar nature were found by Lewis (2005) and Heinish and Mesner (2005) in 
case of COREPER negotiations. 
(46) Interviews in Brussels. 
(47) Ibid. 
(48) Ibid. 
(49) Jeffrey Lewis (2005: 940), analyzing socialisation in COREPER, observed “the cognitive 
blurring of sharp definitional boundaries between the ‘national’ and ‘European’ frames and a shared 
sense of responsibility to deliver both home and collectively”. This, he claimed, led to complex 
identity changes. Hence, “COREPER’s Janus-like design is an anomaly for theorists who draw rigid 
distinctions between ‘national’ and ‘supranational’ agency” (Lewis, 2005: 967). 
(50) On the other hand, some argued that the effects of socialisation process in Brussels, on example 
of COREPER, can be “undone” (Lewis, 2005: 968). 
(51) Interviews in Brussels. 
(52) Ibid. 
(53) Ibid. 
(54) Ibid. 
(55) Unfortunately, interviewing diplomats poses several practical problems. The rotation in 
Working Groups is high, with people being moved between capitals and Brussels. Getting an access 
for conducting such in-depth, repetitive, usually long-lasting sociological analysis, keeping track of 
the changing group’s members, would require a long-term project.  
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